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RESTORING SANITY TO SUBROGATION
AFTER SEREBOFF
Holly Ludwig*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.1 single-handedly destroyed
all of the equitable doctrines and approaches that states had developed to deal
with reimbursement claims and paved the way for insurance companies to take
more of tort victims’ settlements than ever before.  In Sereboff, the Supreme
Court took Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)
reimbursement claims out of the control of state contract law and placed them
in the hands of the federal courts, which so far have shown little desire to
uphold any of the equitable doctrines and approaches that states have used for
decades.2
This Note explores the flaws in the Sereboff decision and the resulting
devastating consequences.  In Part II, this Note reviews the history and pur-
poses of the ERISA legislation.  Part III explores the purposes and history of
subrogation.  Part IV traces the Supreme Court decisions leading up to the Ser-
eboff decision.  Part V provides a detailed summary of the Sereboff decision
and its rationale.  Part VI explores the different state law approaches to subro-
gation and the federal courts’ approach to subrogation in ERISA cases.  Finally,
Part VII provides an analysis of Sereboff and its impacts on insurance law and
future ERISA litigation.
This Note argues the Sereboff Court’s rationale is erroneous and that the
federal courts’ evisceration of the made whole doctrine and the pro rata
approach in ERISA subrogation claims is inequitable, contrary to the purpose
of the statute, and imposes costs that substantially outweigh any resulting bene-
fits.  Moreover, this Note contends that the circuit courts applying Sereboff
have severely mischaracterized the decision, much to the detriment of the tort
victim.  This Note concludes that the pro rata approach is the most equitable
way to address ERISA subrogation claims and should become a part of federal
common law.  Solidifying the pro rata approach in federal common law is the
best solution for resolving ERISA subrogation claims because it will substan-
tially reduce litigation and produce the most equitable result.
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2009.  The author thanks Professor
Jeffrey Stempel for his assistance in developing this Note; Tom Drendel for inspiring the
writing of this Note; and her father, Jon Ludwig, for the countless hours he spent talking
through the ideas in this Note with her.
1 See generally Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).
2 See id. 
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II. ERISA
ERISA is the primary federal statute regulating employee benefit plans,
including group health insurance.3  ERISA was initially passed to protect pri-
vate employee pension plans from abuse and mismanagement through the
imposition of federal standards.4  ERISA is a complex statute that has two pur-
poses.5  First, and most important, ERISA serves “to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”6  The second
purpose is to ensure “ERISA plans be uniform in their interpretation and simple
in their application.”7  Put simply, the first purpose of ERISA is to protect
employees and the second is to protect employers.8
Whether ERISA governs a health insurance plan is a fairly complex ques-
tion.  However, satisfying the requirements for ERISA governance is not
exceptionally difficult.  As of 1998, 64.2% of non-elderly Americans had
employment-based health insurance.9  Thus, a majority of Americans have
health insurance governed by ERISA.  The Fifth Circuit outlined a three-part
test for determining when ERISA controls a health insurance plan:  (1) all the
safe harbor provisions must be applicable; (2) the “plan” must be ascertainable
from the surrounding circumstances; and (3) the plan must be “established or
maintained” by the employer for the purposes of providing benefits to employ-
ees.10  The “safe-harbor” provision from part one of this test states:
The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” shall not include a
group or group-type insurance program offered by an insurer to employees . . . under
which
(1) No contributions are made by an employer . . .
(2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employees . . .
(3) The sole functions of the employer . . . with respect to the program are,
without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to
employees . . . to collect premiums through payroll deductions . . . and to remit
them to the insurer[s]; and
(4) The employer . . . receives no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise
in connection with the program other than reasonable compensation, excluding
3 Jeffrey M. Gorris, Comment, Waivers of ERISA Plan Benefits:  Preventing Judicial Inter-
pretations of a Complex Statute from Frustrating the Statute’s Simple Purpose, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 717, 719 (2007).
4 Len M. Nichols & Linda J. Blumberg, A Different Kind of ‘New Federalism’? The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 25,
28, available at http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/Devolution/UI_A_Different_Kind_of_New_
Federaism_The_Health_Insurance_Portability_And_Accountability_Act_Of_199_00331_02
711.pdf.
5 Gorris, supra note 3, at 721.
6 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); Gorris, supra note 3, at 721.
7 McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990); Gorris, supra note 3, at 721.
8 Gorris, supra note 3, at 721.
9 Paul Fronstin, 64.2 Percent of Nonelderly Americans Have Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 18.3 Percent Are Uninsured, EBRI NOTES (Employee Benefit Research Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1998, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/1198
notes.pdf.
10 McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1995); THOMAS
H. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL, ERISA SUBROGATION:  ENFORCING RECOUPMENT PRO-
VISIONS IN ERISA-COVERED HEALTH AND DISABILITY PLANS 10 (2000).
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any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with pay-
roll deductions . . . .11
Thus, a health insurance plan must satisfy all four of the safe-harbor fac-
tors in order to be excluded from ERISA.12  A “plan” is established if “from the
surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the intended bene-
fits, beneficiaries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits.”13
Such a “plan” likely will be covered under ERISA if it falls outside at least one
of the safe-harbor provisions, meets the statutory definition of an “employee
welfare benefit plan,” and is “established or maintained” by an employer.14
Furthermore, ERISA defines an “Employee Welfare Benefit Plan” as:
Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of pro-
viding for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (a) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment . . . .15
While this definition is seemingly complex, it “can be broken down into
five elements:
(1) a ‘plan, fund or program’;
(2) established or maintained;
(3) by an employer;
(4) for the purpose of providing health care or disability benefits;
(5) to participants or their beneficiaries.”16
To administer and enforce ERISA’s regulatory scheme so that it could
coexist with state laws governing retirement benefits, Congress added an
expansive preemption clause, dictating ERISA “shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.”17  The
Supreme Court interpreted this preemption clause broadly in Boggs v. Boggs,18
when it held ERISA preempts state law that either “conflicts with the provi-
sions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects.”19  This expansive preemp-
tion provision creates gaps in the law where ERISA preempts the state law
addressing the issue.  However, the statute does not provide any information on
how to deal with this problem.20  Because the statute provides no guidance,
federal common law must fill in the gaps created by this broad ERISA preemp-
tion.21  Yet, the federal common law approach poses special problems in an
11 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2008); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 10.
12 Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 1994); Furgarino v. Hartford
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 178, 184 (6th Cir. 1992); Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940
F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1991); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 11.
13 Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc); LAWRENCE &
RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 11.
14 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 11-12.
15 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 11.
16 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 11.
17 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); Gorris, supra note 3, at 721.
18 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
19 Id. at 841 (1997); Gorris, supra note 3, at 722.
20 Gorris, supra note 3, at 722.
21 Id.
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area such as ERISA subrogation, where the states and the circuits are split on
how to effectively deal with the issue.  While the Supreme Court shirked the
issue in Sereboff, recent circuit court decisions clearly indicate that the
Supreme Court should provide a definite rule on how to effectuate subrogation
clauses in the ERISA context.22
III. SUBROGATION DEFINED
While subrogation used to be strictly limited to equity cases, today subro-
gation is generally recognized “as a doctrine with rather broad dimensions, hav-
ing been extended by the courts to embrace nearly every situation where the
debt of the one is paid by a nonvolunteer who is only secondarily liable for
such debt.”23  Subrogation is rooted in the idea that the “law places the finan-
cial burden of loss on the member(s) of society who ultimately has (have) the
primary legal responsibility for the loss.”24  The word “subrogation” is derived
from the Latin word, subrogare, meaning “to put in place of another or to
substitute.”25  There are four essential elements of the general subrogation
doctrine:
(1) the party claiming subrogation must first pay the debt;
(2) the person seeking subrogation has a direct interest in the discharge of
the debt;
(3) the person seeking subrogation is secondarily liable for the debt or
discharge of the lien; and
(4) no injustice will be done to the other party by allowing the equity.26
Subrogation is often applied in the insurance context when an insurance
company reimburses its insured for injuries he suffered because of a
tortfeasor’s negligence.27  Although subrogation technically only permits the
insurer to pursue the tortfeasor alone, an insurer has other rights enabling it to
recover from an insured who has already been compensated.28  The purposes of
subrogation are several:  to prevent the insured from double recovery, discour-
age carelessness, prevent unjust enrichment, ensure that the wrongdoer is the
one who actually pays for the harm caused, and reimburse the insurer for the
payment which was made.29  Doctor Ronald Horn30 argues that “the general
22 See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1869 (2006); Admin. Comm. of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (8th Cir.
2007); Moore v. Capitalcare, Inc., 461 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
23 RONALD C. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1964).
24 Id. at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. at 12.
26 Hampton Loan & Exch. Bank v. Lightsey, 152 S.E. 425, 427 (S.C. 1930); HORN, supra
note 23, at 12.
27 Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Insurance and Subrogation:  When the Pie Isn’t Big Enough, Who
Eats Last?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1997).
28 Id.
29 HORN, supra note 23, at 24; Melissa A. Perry,Comment, Is the Made-Whole Requirement
More Than We Bargained For?: From Franklin to Tallant—A Call to Reexamine the Made-
Whole Doctrine in Arkansas, 60 ARK. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007).
30 Dr. Horn was the Director of Educational Services for the American College of Life
Underwriters and Professor of Insurance and Statistics at Syracuse University. HORN, supra
note 23, at ix-x.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ206.txt unknown Seq: 5 17-APR-09 8:53
Winter 2009] RESTORING SANITY TO SUBROGATION 435
purpose of subrogation is to facilitate placement of the financial consequences
of loss on the party primarily responsible for such loss.”31  He notes that most
of the other purposes cited for subrogation “are really reasons that the party
breaching a duty should be held liable (and, accordingly, reasons that subroga-
tion should be encouraged).  It is the distribution of responsibility, not subroga-
tion, which helps prevent unjust enrichment.”32
Historians generally agree that the subrogation doctrine is derived from
the Roman civil law doctrine of Cessio Actionum and was subsequently built
upon by French writers.33  Robert Pothier34 conceptualized subrogation as “a
fiction of law by which a creditor is regarded as giving up his rights and privi-
leges to one from whom he receives payment.”35  The English courts recog-
nized subrogation as early as 1637.36  Even though the doctrine itself was well
established by the middle of the seventeenth century, the basis for the right
remained unclear until the early part of the twentieth century.37  In 1815, in the
seminal case of Cheeseborough v. Millard,38 the Chancery Court of New York
decided the right to subrogation would be available to insurers under the equita-
ble principle of unjust enrichment.39  Hence, in the mid-1800s, subrogation was
treated as an equitable principle, to be administered to secure justice, and inde-
pendent of any contractual relations between the parties.40
Until the mid-twentieth century, the doctrine of subrogation was generally
inapplicable to accident and health insurance.41  In Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee
Electric Co.,42 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held, in the absence of an
indemnity feature, an accident insurance contract should be read as an invest-
ment contract concerning only the insurer and the insured or beneficiary.43
Moreover, the court noted accident insurance contracts could not be called
indemnity contracts because they provide for payments not derived from the
amount of damages sustained by the injured party.44  In Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. J.B. Parker & Co.,45 the Supreme Court of Texas held that the insured’s
right to recover under accident insurance is a property right that is purchased
and not a right to indemnity for a definitely ascertainable loss.46  The New
31 Id. at 24.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 15; Greenblatt, supra note 27, at 1339.
34 Pothier was a celebrated eighteenth-century French lawyer who arranged texts of the
Roman Law and wrote several treatises.  He is primarily known for publishing Les Coutumes
d’Orle´ans in 1760. See Auguste Boudinhon, Robert Joseph Pothier, in THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA XII, 321 (1911), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12321a.htm.
35 HORN, supra note 23, at 15.
36 Id. (citing Leon J. Hopper, Insurer’s Rights to Subrogation in Alabama, 5 ALA. L. REV.
276 (1953)).
37 Id. at 16.
38 Cheeseborough v. Millard, 1 Johns Ch. 409 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
39 HORN, supra note 23, at 16.
40 HENRY N. SHELDON, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION 2 (Boston, Soule and Bugbee1882).
41 See HORN, supra note 23.
42 Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 116 N.W. 633 (Wis. 1908).
43 Id. at 634; HORN, supra note 23, at 198-99.
44 Gatzweiler, 116 N.W. at 634; HORN, supra note 23, at 198-99.
45 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. J.B. Parker & Co., 72 S.W. 168 (Tex. 1903).
46 Id. at 168; HORN, supra note 23, at 199.
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York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, rounded out the early subrogation
cases in Suttles v. Railway Mail Association47 stating:
The theory and basis of the right of the insurer to subrogation is that the insured has a
claim against a third person, which he could enforce for the loss insured against.  But
although the assured may be able to recoup his loss, partially or in full, by enforcing
some contract, or other right, he may have, which is not dependent upon the direct
responsibility of such person for the loss insured against, that fact does not clothe the
insurer with the right of subrogation thereto, at least in the absence of an agreement
in the policy to that effect.48
The rationale behind excluding subrogation from health and other personal
insurances (and not other common policies of property or casualty insurance)
was that, in the common policies, the insured sustained a fixed financial loss
and the purpose was to place the loss ultimately on the wrongdoer.49  However,
in personal insurance contracts, the loss cannot be exactly ascertained.50  Thus,
the reasons for preventing double recoveries are not the same.51  However, this
rationale only applies to health insurance contracts, which do not contain
express subrogation provisions.52  John Alan Appleman’s53 insurance law trea-
tise notes, “if a subrogation provision were expressly contained in such con-
tracts, it probably would be enforced quite uniformly.”54
The expansion of subrogation into the personal insurance arena is the
result of the insurance industry taking a cue from decisional law and including
subrogation provisions in their personal and health insurance plans.55  The
insurance companies also used their prominence to “hail[ ] subrogation as the
chief mechanism for maintaining low insurance premiums.”56  Today, virtually
all insurance policies contain a subrogation clause.57
47 Suttles v. Ry. Mail Ass’n, 141 N.Y.S. 1024 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913).
48 Id. at 1025.
49 3 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1675, at
495 (4th reprint 1987).
50 APPLEMAN, supra note 49, § 1675, at 495. See also HORN, supra note 23, at 200 (quoting
3 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1675, at 278 (Vernon Law Book
Co. 1949)).
51 APPLEMAN, supra note 49, § 1675, at 495. See also HORN, supra note 23, at 200 (quoting
3 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1675, at 278 (Vernon Law Book
Co. 1949)).
52 HORN, supra note 23, at 201.
53 John Alan Appleman has published two treatises on insurance law, including APPLEMAN,
supra note 49, and ERIC M. HOLMES & JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1997).
54 APPLEMAN, supra note 49, § 1675, at 497. See also HORN, supra note 23, at 200 (quoting
3 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1675, at 278 (Vernon Law Book
Co. 1949)).
55 Johnny C. Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine:  Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the
Mystery of Insurance Subrogation, 70 MO. L. REV. 723, 736 (2005).
56 Id.
57 See id.
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IV. THE ROAD TO SEREBOFF
In order to be covered by ERISA, a reimbursement claim must fall under
one of the specific types of civil actions outlined in the ERISA statute.58  The
only provision in ERISA remotely supporting a reimbursement claim is 29
U.S.C § 1132(a)(3), which concerns claims for equitable relief to enforce a
term of the plan.59  This section states:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought –
. . . .
(3) by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan . . . .60
If the claim qualifies under subsection (a), then the federal court has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear the claim pursuant to subsection (e):
 (1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the district courts
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this sub-
chapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or any
person referred to in section 1021(f)(1) of this title. State courts of competent juris-
diction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of
actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection (a) of this section.61
The only other place in the extensive ERISA statute where subrogation is
discussed is in 29 U.S.C. § 1403(c)(2)(B), regarding withdrawal liability pay-
ment funds.62  Until Sereboff, the Supreme Court struggled with defining
“equitable relief” under section 1132.63  Beneficiaries argued that reimburse-
ment claims sought money; therefore, the claim could not be upheld as one for
equitable relief.64  The insurers, on the other hand, argued that “money can be
part of an equitable claim for restitution, to enforce or lien, or under the equity
clean-up doctrine.”65
The first major case to address the equitable relief issue was Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates.66  In Mertens, a class of former employees of the Kaiser
Steel Corporation (Kaiser) sought monetary damages for the defendants’
alleged breach of their fiduciary duties.67  Kaiser mismanaged the retirement
plan such that the plan’s assets were insufficient to satisfy its benefit obliga-
tions.68  The plan was terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1341, and the
employees were left with only the benefits guaranteed by ERISA, which were
58 James T. Nyeste, Health Plans’ Claims for Reimbursement from Personal Injury Recov-
ery:  Recent ERISA Rulings, Unanswered Questions, ILL. B.J., May 2007, at 244, 245.
59 Id.
60 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
61 Id. § 1132(e).
62 Id. § 1403(c)(2)(B).
63 Nyeste, supra note 58, at 245.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
67 Id. at 250.
68 Id.
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substantially less than they would have received under their fully vested pen-
sion plan.69  In addition to suing the fiduciaries of the plan, the employees also
sued Hewitt, the plan’s actuary, alleging that it was responsible for causing the
losses by breaching its professional duties to the plan.70  The district court dis-
missed the complaint, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.71
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether ERISA
authorizes suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly par-
ticipate in a fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty.”72  Because Hewitt was not a
fiduciary under ERISA, the employees argued that section 1132(a)(3) sup-
ported their claim, because their claim constituted “other appropriate equitable
relief” under section 1132(a)(3).73  The Court noted that the employees were
not seeking a traditional equitable remedy, such as injunction or restitution:
“Although they often dance around the word, what petitioners in fact seek is
nothing other than compensatory damages–monetary relief for all losses their
plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.  Money
damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”74  The Court decided
that the remedies afforded under ERISA to beneficiaries harmed by a nonfidu-
ciary constitute relief that was typically available in a court of equity, i.e.
“injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages.”75
“‘Equitable relief must mean something less than all relief.”76  Because the
employees were seeking nothing more than compensatory damages, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.77
Mertens created extreme disparities in the circuits over what constituted
equitable relief in the ERISA context.78  In Health Cost Controls v. Skinner,79
the Seventh Circuit held that restitution and a constructive trust were permissi-
ble forms of relief under Mertens.80  The Ninth Circuit had a very different
interpretation of equitable relief.  It held, under Mertens, claims for restitution
could not be made under ERISA unless the monies were acquired “as the return
of ‘ill-gotten’ assets or profits taken from a plan.”81  In FMC Medical Plan v.
Owens,82 the Ninth Circuit found that “Owens did not obtain FMC’s funds by
any fraud or wrong-doing.  Owens obtained the funds pursuant to the Plans,
which obligated the funds to be paid to him . . . .”83  The FMC court held that
FMC was ultimately seeking monetary relief for a breach of contract claim and
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 251.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 253.
74 Id. at 255.
75 Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 258 n.8.
77 Id. at 263.
78 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998); FMC
Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997); Health Cost Controls v. Skinner, 44
F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995); see also LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 21.
79 Health Cost Controls, 44 F.3d 535.
80 Id. at 538 n.7.
81 FMC Med. Plan, 122 F.3d at 1261.
82 FMC Med. Plan, 122 F.3d 1258.
83 Id. at 1261.
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such relief did not constitute “equitable reimbursement” under ERISA.84  The
Eleventh Circuit took yet another view, arguing that the Ninth Circuit in FMC
interpreted Mertens too narrowly.85  It concluded in Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama v. Sanders86 that specific performance was a permissible form of
equitable relief under Mertens.87
Taking a cue from the extreme confusion in the circuits, the Supreme
Court addressed a benefits reimbursement claim in Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson.88  In that case, Mrs. Knudson was rendered a
quadriplegic by a car accident.89  Mrs. Knudson was covered by her then hus-
band’s health insurance, which he had acquired through his employer, Earth
Systems, Inc.90  The plan covered over $400,000 of Mrs. Knudson’s healthcare
costs, most of which Great-West paid.91  The plan contained a reimbursement
provision giving Great-West the right to recoup any benefits it paid to the bene-
ficiary if the beneficiary later recovered those benefits from a third party in the
form of damages.92  The provision further provided that if the beneficiary
recovered from a third party and failed to reimburse the plan, the beneficiary
would be personally liable for the amount the plan expended for medical
expenses.93
The Knudsons filed a tort action against Hyundai and other tortfeasors and
settled the dispute for $650,000.94  A little less than $14,000 was allotted to
Great-West for the medical expenses it paid.95  Almost all of the settlement was
placed in a special needs trust for the future care of Mrs. Knudson.96  Great-
West filed an action under ERISA in federal court for reimbursement of the full
amount of medical costs it had paid.97  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal, holding, “judicially decreed reimbursement for payments
made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable
relief and is therefore not authorized by § 502(a)(3).”98
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and denied relief to Great-West,
finding it was seeking to impose personal liability on the Knudsons “for a con-
tractual obligation to pay money – relief that was not typically available in
equity.”99  The Court noted that Great-West had failed to characterize the relief
sought as “equitable” under the standard set by Mertens.100  Great-West argued
84 Id.
85 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1353 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998).
86 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. , 138 F.3d 1347.
87 Id. at 1353 n.5.
88 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 204 (2002).
89 Id. at 207.
90 Id.
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.
95 Id. at 208.
96 Id. at 207-08.
97 Id. at 208.
98 Id. at 209.
99 Id. at 209-10.
100 Id. at 210.
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it was seeking restitution, a form of equitable relief.101  The Court noted the
funds Great-West was seeking for reimbursement were not in the Knudsons’
possession because they had been placed in a trust.102  Thus, Great-West was
not claiming that the Knudsons were holding funds, which in good conscious
belonged to it, but that Great-West was contractually entitled to recoup some of
the funds for the benefits it paid out.103  “The kind of restitution that petitioners
seek, therefore, is not equitable–the imposition of a constructive trust or equita-
ble lien on particular property–but legal–the imposition of personal liability for
the benefits that it conferred upon respondents.”104  The Court clarified that
restitution is not exclusively an equitable remedy and determining whether it is
equitable or not is dependent on the type of relief sought.105  In this case, the
relief sought was clearly legal restitution, not equitable.106
Knudson created enormous confusion for lower courts construing health
care plan reimbursement claims.107  Some courts read Knudson as creating a
“possession test,” which allowed reimbursement “if the beneficiary was in pos-
session of clearly identifiable funds from personal injury settlement.”108  Other
courts read Knudson as barring plan reimbursement claims, because the claims
were for legal damages as “they do not seek the recovery of the actual benefits
payments by the plan and, thus, do not seek equitable restitution.”109  Four
years after Knudson was decided, the Supreme Court addressed the disagree-
ment in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.110
V. MOVING IN A NEW DIRECTION–SEREBOFF
From the Mertens and Knudson decisions, it appeared the Supreme Court
was moving towards prohibiting group health plans from claiming reimburse-
ment under ERISA.  However, in the landmark decision of Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., the Supreme Court unexpectedly changed
course and allowed the insurance company to sustain its claim for reimburse-
101 Id. at 212.
102 Id. at 214.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 215.
106 Id. at 218.
107 Nyeste, supra note 58, at 246.
108 Id. See also Mid Atl. Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 218-19 (4th Cir.
2005); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 393 F.3d
1119, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2004); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health &
Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2003); Bombardier Aerospace Employee
Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003);
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Brown, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380-81 (M.D. Ga.
2002).
109 Nyeste, supra note 58, at 246. See also Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638,
648-50 (6th Cir. 2004); Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc); Westaff (USA) Inc. v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2002).
110 Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006); Nyeste, supra note 58, at
246.
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ment under ERISA because it constituted “appropriate equitable relief” pursu-
ant to section 1132(a)(3).111
In Sereboff, Marlene Sereboff’s employer sponsored a group health insur-
ance plan covered by ERISA that Mid Atlantic Medical Services (“Mid Atlan-
tic”) administered.112  Marlene and her husband Joel were beneficiaries under
the plan.113  The plan included a standard reimbursement clause, stating that a
beneficiary who received benefits under the plan for injuries caused by a third
party was required to reimburse Mid Atlantic for those benefits from any and
all recoveries from a third party.114  The plan also contained a clause which
stated Mid Atlantic was entitled to fully recover all benefits paid regardless of
whether the beneficiary was fully compensated in his lawsuit or not.115
The Sereboffs were injured in a car accident, and the plan paid the
couple’s medical expenses.116  The couple commenced a personal injury action
against several tortfeasors.117  Shortly thereafter, Mid Atlantic asserted a lien
on the anticipated damages from the suit for the medical expenses it had paid
out.118  The Sereboffs settled their suit for $750,000, but never satisfied Mid
Atlantic’s lien, which was close to $75,000.119
Mid Atlantic filed a suit in district court under section 1132(a)(3), seeking
reimbursement of the medical expenses it had paid.120  The Sereboffs’ attorney
had already distributed the settlement proceeds to the Sereboffs, so Mid Atlan-
tic sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring
the couple to set aside $74,869.73 from the settlement.121  The Sereboffs
agreed to set aside the amount in an investment account until the court decided
the merits of the case.122  The district court ruled in Mid Atlantic’s favor and
ordered the Sereboffs to pay the amount related to medical expenses, plus inter-
est, with a deduction for Mid Atlantic’s share of attorney’s fees and costs that
the Sereboffs had incurred during their tort suit.123  The Sereboffs appealed,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting the circuits were divided on the ques-
tion of whether ERISA authorizes recovery under these circumstances.124  The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.125
The Court first noted there was no question that Mid Atlantic was a fiduci-
ary under ERISA seeking to enforce a term of its plan.126  Thus, “the only
111 Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. at 1873.
112 Id. at 1872.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1873.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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question is whether the relief Mid Atlantic requested from the [d]istrict [c]ourt
was ‘equitable’ under § 502(a)(3)(B).”127
The Court stated that in Knudson, it noted “one feature of equitable resti-
tution was that it sought to impose a constructive trust or equitable lien on
‘particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.’”128  The require-
ments for an equitable lien in Knudson were not met, because the settlement
proceeds were not in the Knudson’s possession but instead were placed in a
special needs trust.129  However, in this case, there was no such impediment to
equitable relief because “Mid Atlantic sought ‘specifically identifiable’ funds
that were ‘within the possession and control of the Sereboffs’ . . . .”130  Even
though the claim alleged breach of contract and sought money damages, Mid
Atlantic sought recovery through an equitable lien on a specifically identifiable
fund and not from the Sereboff’s assets, which would be the case in a contract
action at law.131  In Knudson, the Court did not reject the claim because it was
a contract suit for money damages, but rather, because the plaintiffs did not
seek damages from the defendant himself.132  Because Mid Atlantic sought
money damages from the defendants themselves, there was no problem charac-
terizing the relief sought as equitable relief under section 502(a)(3)(B)(ii).133
The Court held that Mid Atlantic had established its claim for reimburse-
ment as equitable.134  The Court analogized the case to Barnes v. Alexander,135
in which attorneys Street and Alexander were promised one third of the contin-
gent fee for performing work for Barnes.136  In Barnes, the Court upheld Alex-
ander and Street’s equitable claim to their portion of the fee on the basis of the
rule in equity that “a contract to convey a specific object even before it is
acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the
thing.”137  Thus, the Court concluded Barnes’ agreement “create[d] a lien”
upon the monetary recovery to which Barnes was entitled, which Street and
Alexander could “‘follow . . . into the hands of . . . Barnes,’ ‘as soon as [the
fund] was identified.’”138
In Sereboff, the Court stated that, like Barnes’ promise to Alexander and
Street, the reimbursement provision in the Sereboffs’ plan “specifically identi-
fied a particular fund . . . and a particular share of that fund to which Mid
Atlantic was entitled.”139  Therefore, Mid Atlantic could rely on the rule used
in Barnes to collect the money it had paid out for the Sereboffs’ medical
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1874 (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Brown, 534 U.S. 204, 213
(2002)).
129 Id. 
130 Id. (quoting Mid Atl. Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 218 (4th Cir. 2005)).
131 Id. at 1872.
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1874-75.
134 Id. 
135 Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914).
136 Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (citing Barnes, 232 U.S. at 119).
137 Id. at 1875 (quoting Barnes, 232 U.S. at 121).
138 Id. (quoting Barnes, 232 U.S. at 123).
139 Id.
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expenses.140  This rule allowed Mid Atlantic to “follow” a part of the settle-
ment proceeds “‘into the [Sereboffs’] hands’ ‘as soon as [the settlement fund]
was identified,’” and imposed a constructive trust or equitable lien on that part
of the fund.141
The Court rejected the Sereboffs’ argument that Mid Atlantic’s suit would
not satisfy the strict tracing rules required for this type of relief.142  The Court
noted the strict tracing rules applied to equitable liens as a matter of restitution,
but not equitable liens by agreement, like those in Barnes and the case at
bar.143  The fact that Great-West had sought equitable restitution in Knudson
did not foreclose Mid Atlantic from seeking recovery under a different equita-
ble lien theory–that of an equitable agreement.144  The Court also noted that it
was of no consequence that the fund in dispute was not in existence when the
equitable lien over the fund was created.145  The Supreme Court therefore
affirmed the Fourth Circuit and held that the Sereboffs were required to reim-
burse Mid Atlantic for funds expended to cover medical expenses under the
plan.146
Sereboff had the important consequence of bringing reimbursement claims
into the realm of ERISA by holding that “where the ERISA plan is enforcing its
reimbursement provision against personal injury settlement proceeds that are
still identifiable and in the beneficiary’s possession, the recovery is ‘equitable
relief’ under section 502(a)(3) in the way of an equitable lien by agreement.”147
In addressing an issue that was creating turmoil in the circuit courts, the Court
only scratched the surface, as many questions were left unanswered by the Ser-
eboff decision, the most pressing of which is what happens when the reim-
bursement provision leaves the beneficiary with little or nothing from the
settlement.
VI. APPROACHES TO SUBROGATION CLAIMS
A. The Made Whole Doctrine
The made whole doctrine, in its original form, is an equitable principle
requiring that the insured be fully compensated before the insurer can assert its
subrogation rights.148  Several jurisdictions use a “modified made whole doc-
trine” grounded in contract theory, which permits the parties to contract out of
the requirement that the insured be fully compensated prior to the insurer
asserting its subrogation rights.149  However, contracting out of the made whole
doctrine requires that the agreement clearly and explicitly reflect the intentions
140 Id.
141 Id. (quoting Barnes, 232 U.S. at 123).
142 Id. 
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1876.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1878.
147 Nyeste, supra note 58, at 246. See also Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. at 1874.
148 Parker, supra note 55, at 737.
149 Id. at 773.
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of the parties that the equitable doctrine is inapplicable.150  Jurisdictions
throughout the country have applied the made whole doctrine in three distinct
ways:  (1) common law equitable made whole doctrine, (2) made whole doc-
trine subject to contractual modification, and (3) made whole doctrine subject
to a balancing of the equities.151
1. Common Law Equitable Made Whole Doctrine
This view of the made whole doctrine states that subrogation is to be gov-
erned by principles of equity.152  The insurance agreement is not determinative
of “the extent to which the right of subrogation [can] be exercised.”153  In other
words, “the made whole doctrine cannot be contractually modified” under any
circumstances.154
2. Made Whole Doctrine Subject to Contractual Modification
This view holds that parties are free to contract out of the made whole
doctrine.155  However, the jurisdictions adopting this view disagree on how
specific the contractual language has to be in order to be valid.156  There are
four prevailing views concerning the specificity of the contract language:
(1) general language is sufficient;
(2) the language must be “clear, explicit and/or specific;”
(3) the language must be clear and specific and the insurer must actively
participate in the recovery process; or
(4) the agreement must use “magical or unequivocal words.”157
3. Made Whole Doctrine Subject to a Balancing of the Equities
Under this view, the court takes into account “the facts and circumstances
of the case, conduct of the parties, contractual language and the general public
policy that the insured should be made whole . . . .”158  Generally, the courts
adopting this view favor complete compensation of the insured before enforc-
ing a subrogation clause.159
B. Other Approaches:  Pro Tanto and Pro Rata
While most jurisdictions follow one of the three forms of the made whole
doctrine,160 others subscribe to either a “pro tanto” or “pro rata” sharing
approach in subrogation cases.161  The pro tanto approach permits the insurer
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 773-75.
152 Id. at 774.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 774-75.
157 Id. at 775.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 774-75.
161 Greenblatt, supra note 27, at 1339.
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be paid before the insured is made whole.162  The pro rata approach falls
between the made whole doctrine and the pro tanto approach and requires the
recovery to be split pro rata.163  “Each party recover[s] an amount in proportion
to the percentage of the total loss it bore minus its pro rata share of the costs
incurred in recovering from the tortfeasor.”164
C. Federal Common Law and the Made Whole Doctrine
All of the aforementioned doctrines are derived from state contract law
principles.  However, under the Sereboff decision, state law no longer controls
subrogation.  Therefore, federal common law’s treatment of subrogation claims
becomes important.  Unfortunately, the federal courts’ decisions all consist-
ently point to the demise of the use of the made whole doctrine and the pro rata
approach in ERISA subrogation claims.165
Congress intended that the judiciary develop federal common law to sup-
plement ERISA’s provisions.166  “Federal common law can only be applied as
a gap-filler where a clause is found to be ambiguous or silent on a particular
issue.”167  Some of the federal courts have adopted a common law “made
whole” rule that “prevents health plans from obtaining reimbursement until a
covered person has been compensated fully for his injuries.”168  The Ninth Cir-
cuit defined the common law made whole rule as the “generally accepted rule
that, in the absence of a clear contract provision to the contrary, an insured
must be made whole before an insurer can enforce its right to subrogation.”169
However, the circuits are split over “when, if ever,” the made whole doc-
trine applies.170  Before the Sereboff decision, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
held the federal common law made whole doctrine only applied if it was
expressly stated in the plan.171  These circuits heavily favored insurance com-
panies’ subrogation rights.172  Other circuits, including the Ninth and Sixth,
held that if the plan established priority of payment, the federal common law
made whole rule would not apply.173  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held the
162 Id. at 1343.
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v.
Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 839 (8th Cir. 2007).
166 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra
note 10, at 71.
167 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 71. See also Sanders v. Scheideler, 816 F.
Supp. 1338, 1346 (W.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d, No. 93-3044, 1994 WL 234497, at *2 (7th Cir.
June 1, 1994).
168 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 72.
169 Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass’n of Cal. Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d
1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 72.
170 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 72.
171 See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1997); Sunbeam-Oster
Co. Group Benefits Plan v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1376 (5th Cir. 1996); LAWRENCE &
RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 73.
172 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 73.
173 See Marshall v. Employers Health Ins. Co., Nos. 96-6063, 96-6112, 1997 WL 809997,
at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1997); Barnes, 64 F.3d at 1395; In re Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748
(D. Md. 1999); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 75.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ206.txt unknown Seq: 16 17-APR-09 8:53
446 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:431
federal common law made whole doctrine applied unless the plan specifically
stated otherwise.174  Even though three of the circuits adopted the made whole
doctrine into federal common law as a default rule, it appears all of the circuits
agree that the doctrine can be superseded if there is a clear contractual provi-
sion to the contrary.175
After the Sereboff decision, the Eighth Circuit went a step further in pro-
moting insurance companies’ subrogation rights in Administrative Committee
of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health and Welfare Plan v. Shank.176  In
Shank, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the made whole doctrine “is not a
rule of federal common law that governs our interpretation of the written provi-
sions of ERISA-regulated plan benefits.”177  The court noted the made whole
doctrine “originated in the law of insurance, where the overriding purpose of an
insurance policy is to fully compensate the insured in case of loss, but that
many ERISA-regulated benefit plans do not share that purpose.”178  Unlike
individual insurance plans, one of the primary purposes of ERISA is to “ensure
the integrity of written plans and to protect the expectations of participants and
beneficiaries.”179  The court rejected the Shanks’ argument that not applying
the made whole doctrine is contrary to ERISA’s main purpose of protecting
plan participants and beneficiaries because, without it, beneficiaries could only
recover a small amount of their injuries and would be no better off than if they
had not joined the group health plan in the first place.180  The court said the
better approach was to enforce the plan as written, because if the plan did not
allow full reimbursement, the Shanks would be better off, but everyone else in
the plan would suffer from higher premiums.181
Sereboff brought subrogation claims under the governance of ERISA,
leaving the federal courts, such as the Eighth Circuit in Shank, to establish
federal common law to address such claims.182 Shank is an alarming case,
because it holds the made whole doctrine will not be adopted into federal com-
mon law.183 Shank is a terrible precedent that other circuits should not follow
because the case ignores the fact that subrogation claims are analogous to equi-
table liens and are therefore subject to equitable doctrines and principles.184
Moreover, courts should not follow Shank because the case derogates from
critical tenants of federal common law.185
174 Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1997); King v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co.,
998 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (N.D. Ga. 1996); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 77.
175 See, e.g., Copeland Oaks v. Haupt, 209 F.3d 811, 813 (6th Cir. 2000); Cagle, 112 F.3d
at 1521; Barnes, 64 F.3d at 1395.
176 Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500
F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2007).
177 Id. at 837 (citing Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138 (8th Cir. 1997)).
178 Id. at 837-38.
179 Id. at 838.
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).
183 Shank, 500 F.3d at 839.
184 See Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. 1869; discussion infra Part VII.
185 See discussion infra Part VII.
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VII. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE SEREBOFF DECISION
ON ERISA SUBROGATION CLAIMS
The Sereboff decision’s flawed reasoning has, and likely will continue to
have, devastating impacts on subrogation claims.  The decision is flawed in that
it mischaracterizes ERISA reimbursement claims as equitable liens by agree-
ment.  Moreover, subjecting identifiable proceeds in the beneficiary’s posses-
sion to an equitable lien will create more problems than it solves.  Even though
the Sereboff decision permits federal courts to ignore the made whole doctrine
and the pro rata approach in subrogation claims, the courts should instead opt to
incorporate these state law equitable doctrines into ERISA federal common
law.  Specifically, the pro rata approach should become the majority rule for
dealing with ERISA subrogation claims because it is the most equitable and
insurers have failed to prove that its application would result in higher
premiums.
A. Sereboff Erroneously Concludes that Reimbursement Claims under
ERISA Constitute Equitable Liens by Agreement
The Supreme Court’s characterization of Mid Atlantic’s reimbursement
claim as an equitable lien by agreement is troubling for several reasons.  First,
the analogy to Barnes is flawed in one important respect:  the agreement
between Barnes, Alexander and Street, which involved Alexander and Street
agreeing to work for their colleague, Barnes, in exchange for a portion of the
attorneys’ fees, was a direct agreement where each party had equal bargaining
power and was faced with a rational choice.  Barnes could either choose to ask
Alexander and Street for help and share his fee with them, or he could do all
the work himself and keep the entire fee.  Alexander and Street shared a similar
rational choice:  they could agree to help Barnes and share the fee, or they
could not help him and dedicate their time to other money-making endeavors.
However, in the ERISA context, the insured (beneficiary) does not have a
rational choice.  Consider the hypothetical case of Worker Bob.  Worker Bob is
hired at Company X, and as part of his benefits package he receives health
insurance.  Worker Bob does not get to choose whether he gets health insurance
or not; in fact, one of the safe-harbor provisions of ERISA states that participa-
tion in the plan should be mandatory.186  He does not have the option of asking
for additional compensation instead of health insurance.  While Worker Bob
does have the option of going out and purchasing private health insurance in
addition to the insurance provided for him by Company X, no rational person
would choose to do so because it would involve purchasing something one
already has (or involve paying for another full policy in order to avoid
subrogation).
Additionally, Worker Bob does not have the option of obtaining health
insurance from Company X that is not subject to subrogation, because the
entire company has to have the same plan.  Moreover, even if paying a higher
premium so that one does not have to be subject to subrogation was an availa-
ble option, no company would exercise that choice.  A company would forego
186 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2008); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 10.
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this option because it would have to pay more to insure its employees and
would receive nothing in return because all the benefits of not having a subro-
gation clause would go directly to the employees, not the employer.  Finally,
Worker Bob’s other option is to decline the job offer from Company X and find
a job with another company that provides better health benefits.  However, as
previously stated, the odds of Worker Bob finding a company that will provide
him with health insurance that is not subject to subrogation are poor, and
declining a job on that basis is irrational.
While the definition of an agreement is broad, it still requires “a manifes-
tation of mutual assent.”187  One could argue Worker Bob assented to the group
health insurance subrogation clause by agreeing to work at Company X.  How-
ever, this statement does not end the inquiry.  The agreement still has to equita-
ble.  Equity implies fairness.  Surely when Worker Bob has no other rational
choice but to agree to the group health insurance plan, that agreement cannot be
considered equitable.  In light of the patent differences between agreeing to
work for a colleague in exchange for a cut of the fee (as in Barnes) and basi-
cally being forced to accept one’s company health insurance because one has
no other rational choice, the Sereboff Court’s characterization of a subrogation
clause in an ERISA plan as an equitable lien “by agreement” wholly misses the
mark.
B. Sereboff’s Rule that Identifiable Proceeds in the Beneficiary’s
Possession are Subject to an Equitable Lien is an Unworkable
Standard
The Sereboff Court left unanswered what constitutes identifiable proceeds
in the beneficiary’s possession.188  However, the Court did reaffirm the holding
in Knudson that funds placed in a special needs trust were not subject to an
equitable lien because they were not in the defendant’s possession.189  The pro-
ceeds also have to be “identifiable,” yet the Court failed to define the scope of
this term as well.
This rule requiring the defendant to be in possession of the funds in order
to be subject to an equitable lien has and will continue to spawn all sorts of
undesired consequences.  The rule encourages tort victims to hide their settle-
ment proceeds, find creative ways to keep it out of their legal possession, and/
or make the settlement recovery not legally “identifiable.”  Such tactics can
only result in additional litigation and costs.  Therefore, simply implementing a
bright line pro rata rule not only would be equitable, but would also prevent
such tactics.
C. Eviscerating the Made Whole Doctrine and the Pro Rata Approach in
ERISA Subrogation Claims is Inequitable
ERISA could not be more clear–“A civil action may be brought . . . by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary . . . to obtain other appropriate equitable
187 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 74 (8th ed. 2004).
188 Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. at 1874.
189 Id. (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207, 214
(2002)).
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relief.”190  Under Sereboff, the equitable relief arose from the fact that Mid
Atlantic sought recovery through an equitable lien.191 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “equitable lien” as:  “[a] right, enforceable only in equity, to have a
demand satisfied from a particular fund or specific property, without having
possession of the fund or property.”192  Because Sereboff defined the type of
relief Mid Atlantic was seeking as an “equitable lien,” equitable principles
applied. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “do equity” as follows:  “(Of one who
seeks an equitable remedy) to treat or offer to treat the other party as fairly as is
necessary, short of abandoning one’s own legal rights, to bring about a fair
result. The phrase derives from the maxim ‘One who seeks equity must do
equity.’”193
Equity is grounded in the concept of fairness and, as the definition illus-
trates, the requirement to do equity is only between the parties to the suit.
Therefore, for the circuits to abandon the made whole doctrine and the pro rata
approach because it might result in higher premiums to the other plan mem-
bers194 is contrary to the definition of doing equity.  Moreover, how can deny-
ing a tort victim his entire damage recovery be fair?  Over ninety percent of tort
claims are settled; thus, “[v]irtually by definition[,] the claimants in these cases
receive less than full compensation.”195
In light of the limited equitable remedies afforded under ERISA, the most
equitable standard to use is the pro rata approach.  This approach allows both
the insured and the insurance company to take an equal share of the recovery
and is most consistent with the principle of “one who seeks equity must do
equity.”196
D. The State Law Equitable Doctrines and Approaches Should be
Incorporated into ERISA Federal Common Law
State law principles governed subrogation litigation for several decades,
up until the Sereboff decision in 2006.  Unfortunately, private parties enter into
insurance contracts with the mistaken expectation that state law standards will
govern their rights because they lack knowledge of the Sereboff case.  Specifi-
cally, “[t]he presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal
common law is particularly strong in areas in which private parties have
entered legal relationships in the expectation that their rights would be gov-
erned by state-law standards . . . .”197  Moreover, this expectation occurs
because state law has been traditionally governed by contract law.
190 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
191 Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. at 1874.
192 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 187, at 942.
193 Id. at 521.
194 See Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank,
500 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2007).
195 Kenneth S. Abraham, Twenty-First-Century Insurance and Loss Distribution in Tort
Law, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 81, 95 (M. Stewart Madden ed., 2005).
196 30A C.J.S. Equity § 100 (2008).
197 New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d 201, 208 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991)).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ206.txt unknown Seq: 20 17-APR-09 8:53
450 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:431
In Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,198 the Supreme Court held
that “[i]n deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned,
normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some fed-
eral policy or interest and the use of state law in the [property] must first be
specifically shown.”199  In subrogation claims, no conflict between ERISA and
state law arises that would warrant derogation from the equitable doctrines and
approaches fashioned by the states in dealing with subrogation.  The whole
premise behind bringing subrogation claims under ERISA governance is that
the liens are equitable liens derived from equitable agreements.  Therefore, the
application of the state law equitable doctrines and approaches cannot ration-
ally be in conflict with resolving equitable liens.
E. The Argument that Subrogation Prevents Premiums from Rising is a
Tenuous Argument at Best
Although some argue that subrogation prevents premiums from rising, this
rationale lacks standing.  For example, Professor Edwin Patterson200 notes:
Subrogation is a windfall to the insurer.  It plays no part in rate schedules (or
only a minor one), and no reduction is made in the insuring interests, such as that of
the secured creditor, where the subrogation right will obviously be worth something.
Hence, in such a case, no reason appears for extending it.  Even as to tortfeasors, it is
arguable that since the insurer is paid to take the risk of negligent losses, it should not
shift the loss to another.201
Doctor Ronald Horn202 conversely argues that subrogation is not a wind-
fall to the insurers but concedes that subrogation collection data is not readily
available.203  No industry-wide studies of subrogation exist, and the sole
sources for such information are the insurers themselves.204  The lack of com-
prehensive data makes it difficult to assess the impact subrogation has on insur-
ance companies.  “What does seem clear, despite a lack of complete statistical
documentation, is that net losses would be substantially higher for some [types
of] insurances, in both a relative and an absolute sense, in the absence of the
subrogation doctrine.”205  Therefore, Doctor Horn suggests subrogation is not a
windfall to insurers, nor can it properly be labeled a proximate cause of
profit.206  “Underwriting gains are possible whenever relative subrogation
results are greater than those implicitly assumed in the rate structure, but such
gains are conceptually no different from gains arising out of other areas
wherein the insurer is more efficient than all the companies combined into a
198 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
199 Id. at 68.
200 Professor Patterson was a Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia University
and the Former Deputy Superintendent of Insurance of New York. See EDWIN W. PATTER-
SON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1957).
201 Id. at 151-52.
202 Dr. Horn was the Director of Educational Services for the American College of Life
Underwriters and Professor of Insurance and Statistics at Syracuse University. HORN, supra
note 23, at ix-x.
203 Id. at 146.
204 Id. (emphasis added).
205 Id. at 193.
206 Id.
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single rate base.”207  However, Doctor Horn’s conclusions are unreliable
because they are derived from piecemeal statistics generated from surveys sent
to insurance companies.
Many courts have also criticized the double recovery rationale for subro-
gation and asserted that the insurer is actually the one “who is unjustly enriched
and gains a windfall” if allowed to collect both subrogation and premiums paid
by the insured.208  One persuasive argument is that subrogation merely shifts
the losses from one insurer to another and has no impact on premiums whatso-
ever, because insurance companies are only going to seek subrogation rights
against tortfeasors who are insured.209  Thus, one insurance company pays
another insurance company and, over time, everything comes out even in the
end.210  Moreover, while one of the main purposes of subrogation is to prevent
an insurer from becoming unduly enriched, “the same principle is not applied
to insurers who, if they do not recover any money paid to the insured, have lost
nothing and have gained the premiums.”211
Even if one were to accept the idea that subrogation lowers insurance pre-
miums (which this Note is not conceding), the benefit of lower premiums is
substantially outweighed by the negative costs that subrogation imposes on the
public.212  Subrogation disrupts the settlement process,213 because the insured
knows that the insurance company is going to take a large portion of his settle-
ment.  Therefore, the insured is less likely to settle in hopes that he can be fully
compensated at trial.  This behavior prolongs the litigation process and creates
unnecessary litigation costs.  The settlement process especially stalls “in [cases]
involving multiple subrogation claims, [because] disagreements between the
[parties] tend to complicate and prolong the settlement process,” resulting in
unnecessary costs.214  Subrogation also encourages insurance companies not to
pay the tort victim’s medical costs to begin with, as doing so will encourage the
victim to initiate suit and allow the insurer to recover from the tortfeasor.215
The delay of payment of benefits to the tortfeasor could lead to costly bad faith
litigation in addition to a tort suit and subsequent subrogation suit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Sereboff was incorrectly decided, and its progeny has devastated tort vic-
tims’ settlement rights.  First, Sereboff erroneously concluded that subrogation
claims under ERISA constitute equitable liens by agreement.  The Court’s anal-
ogy to Barnes can only be described as suspect at best.  Further, Sereboff’s rule
that identifiable proceeds in the beneficiary’s possession are subject to an equi-
207 Id.
208 Parker, supra note 55, at 737.
209 JOHN LOWRY & PHILIP RAWLINGS, INSURANCE LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 621
(2004).
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214 Id.
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table lien is an unworkable standard that will result in tort victims hiding their
settlement proceeds and increased litigation.
In light of the conflicting views on whether subrogation has any positive
impact on insurance premiums, federal courts are acting recklessly when they
disregard both the made whole doctrine and the pro rata approach under
ERISA, leaving the insured to face one hundred percent subrogation in all
cases.  Therefore, if Sereboff cannot be overturned, some damage control must
be implemented.  Until the insurance companies can unequivocally prove sub-
rogation is in fact proportionally lowering premiums and the negative costs of
subrogation are in fact outweighed by the reduction in premiums, the most
reasonable alternative is for the federal courts to use the pro rata approach and
allow the insurer and the insured to share equally in the tort recovery.  Addi-
tionally, the pro rata approach is consistent with the principles of equity
embodied in equitable agreements and equitable liens.  Moreover, this state law
principle is not in conflict with the federal policies embodied in ERISA.  Con-
sequently, the pro rata approach developed by the states should be adopted into
federal common law.
